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2I. INTRODUCTION
Only five years after Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakmann1 announced “the 
End of History of Corporate Law” – borrowing the words of Francis Fukuyama2 –, this 
observation seems at least questionable. Following two major failures of the “American 
Model” with the bankruptcy of Enron and WorldCom, the question of the “right” 
Corporate Governance regime is again under discussion.
Legislators around the globe assume that further development of Corporate 
Governance is necessary. There is consent for the need of improvement, but no clear 
answer on how to improve. A first step to solving the arising problems might be to 
evaluate the reasons for collapse of the Corporate Governance regime in place. In the 
U.S., the fall of Enron has been understood primarily as a failure of the gatekeepers,3
meaning the intermediaries who provide verification and certification services to the 
investors (e.g. securities analysts and especially the auditors).4 U.S. legislation in the 
aftermaths of Enron reacted correspondingly: the Sarbanes-Oxley Act5 further regulated 
the accounting profession by implementing a new administrative agency, the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), to set new standards with respect to 
1 Henry Hansmann/Reinier Kraakmann, The End of History for Corporate Law, Harvard Law School, John 
M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business, Discussion Paper No. 280, January 2000.
2 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?, The National Interest, Summer 1989.
3
 Cf. William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules versus Principles versus Rents, 
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 48: p. 1023 (1024).
4
 For this definition of the term “gatekeepers” cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., What caused Enron? A capsule social 
and economic history of the 1990s, Cornell Law Review, Vol. 89: p. 269 (279).
5
 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
3the auditor’s independence, especially with respect to compensation via consulting 
services provided for audit clients. 
This first step of legislation has been criticized for dealing with only part of the 
relevant concerns. Questions relating to auditors have been largely left open. Instead of 
addressing the issue of rotation of audit firms6 directly, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act orders a 
study on this topic.7 Other problems connected to compensation of the persons involved 
have been ignored. Foremost to mention is the management compensation with equity 
instruments.8 Remuneration with stock options rewards risk oriented management 
decision without penalizing for failure. Sarbanes-Oxley Act does not respond to this 
issue. 
How do other jurisdictions cope with these problems? It might be worth exami-
ning the approach of the German labor- or stakeholder oriented model9 of corporate 
governance. Under German law the auditor is not only understood as a gatekeeper, 
assuring the interest of the investing public (so called “Kontrollfunktion” or “Garantie-
funktion”), but also acts as assistant for the supervisory board in its internal control of the 
6
 § 203 of the Act requires auditors only to rotate the lead audit partner, cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., A brief tour 
of the major reforms in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, ALI – American Bar Association Continuing Legal 
Education, Dec. 5, 2002, under II.B.3.
7
 William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules versus Principles versus Rents, 
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 48: p. 1023 (1027).
8 John C. Coffee, Jr., What caused Enron? A capsule social and economic history of the 1990s, Cornell 
Law Review, Vol. 89: p. 269 (275).
9
 See Henry Hansmann/Reinier Kraakmann, The End of History for Corporate Law, Harvard Law School, 
John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business, Discussion Paper No. 280, January 2000, at III.B. 
and D.
4management (so called “Unterstuetzungsfunktion”).10 This complementary role does not 
necessarily trigger different approaches with respect to Corporate Governance – under 
the German concept auditor’s independence is the key as well, as shown by new 
legislation after Enron.
Given similar approaches to similar problems in both jurisdictions, a convergence 
to the one “right” Corporate Governance model might take place. The paper will discuss 
the question of managerial and gatekeeper compensation11, focusing on compensation of 
auditors. Not only remuneration for consulting services, but also compensation schemes 
within the accounting firms might be an issue. Mandatory transparency reports of audit 
firms, proposed by the European Commission, could be a step in this direction. The paper 
will discuss and evaluate these topics.
II. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BEFORE ENRON
1. The role of the auditors
a. U.S. – auditor as gatekeeper
The independent auditor is commonly referred to as a “gatekeeper” of the inves-
ting public, i.e. as an intermediary who provides verification and certification services to 
the investors.12 This common understanding of the auditor is based on the function 
10 Peter Hommelhoff/Daniela Mattheus, Die Rolle des Abschlusspruefers bei der Corporate Governance, in 
Handbuch Corporate Governance, 2003: p. 639 (645).
11
 “Compensation” understood in the broad sense of Coffee, cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., What caused Enron? A 
capsule social and economic history of the 1990s, Cornell Law Review, Vol. 89: p. 269 (271).
12
 For this definition of the term “gatekeepers” cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., What caused Enron? A capsule 
social and economic history of the 1990s, Cornell Law Review, Vol. 89: p. 269 (279).
5assigned to the auditor by the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934. Under this model the 
auditor serves the investing public as well as his client. He allows the investing public to 
choose the right investment based on the firms certified financial statements and enables
the client to achieve lower cost of capital by sending a signal of creditability.13 The 
auditor is understood to be in a strong position and able to force the client to comply with 
all the accounting requirements specified by the auditor, otherwise risking to be “fired” 
by the auditor.14 This strong position is solely based on the auditor’s reputation built up 
over the years of performing similar services for numerous clients.15 Therefore, to stay in 
business requires to forego a short-term gain by participating in a client’s fraud and 
possibly risking the long-term loss of the accounting firm’s reputation.16
b. Germany – auditor as gatekeeper and advisor
As pointed out before,17 the auditor under German law is not only understood as 
the gatekeeper, assuring the interest of the investing public, but also acts as assistant for 
the supervisory board in its internal control of the management.18
13 Jonathan R. Macey/Hillary A. Sale, Observations on the role of commodification, independence, and 
governance in the accounting industry, Villanova Law Review, Vol. 48: p. 1167 (1168/1169); Theodore 
Eisenberg/Jonathan R. Macey, Was Arthur Andersen Different? An Empirical Examination of major 
Accounting Firms’ audits of large clients, Yale Law School, Center for Law, Economics and Public Policy 
Research Paper No. 287, p. 4/5.
14 Jonathan R. Macey/Hillary A. Sale, Observations on the role of commodification, independence, and 
governance in the accounting industry, Villanova Law Review, Vol. 48: p. 1167 (1168/1169).
15 John C. Coffee, Jr., What caused Enron? A capsule social and economic history of the 1990s, Cornell 
Law Review, Vol. 89: p. 269 (280).
16 Jonathan R. Macey/Hillary A. Sale, Observations on the role of commodification, independence, and 
governance in the accounting industry, Villanova Law Review, Vol. 48: p. 1167 (1168, 1173); John C. 
Coffee, Jr., What caused Enron? A capsule social and economic history of the 1990s, Cornell Law Review, 
Vol. 89: p. 269 (280); Theodore Eisenberg/Jonathan R. Macey, Was Arthur Andersen Different? An 
Empirical Examination of major Accounting Firms’ audits of large clients, Yale Law School, Center for 
Law, Economics and Public Policy Research Paper No. 287, p. 5.
17
 See above, under I.
6The function as a gatekeeper slightly differs from the understanding in the U.S. 
One characteristic of the German Corporate Governance model is the fact that large 
institutional investors, typically banks and insurance companies, hold large blocks of 
shares (5% or more).19 These investors typically have more direct access to corporate 
information (e.g. as a corporate lender) and do not have to rely on the companies’
financial statements.20 On the other hand, if the auditor’s failure results in financial loss 
for the blockholder, it might trigger negative reputational consequences more directly. 
Typically, blockholder can influence the outcome of the shareholder vote on the auditor
appointment, especially banks allowed to exercise the voting rights of deposit shares.21
German corporate law endows the company’s auditor with a second function. He 
has to support the supervisory board in its control of the management board.22 German 
corporate law provides for special reporting obligations with respect to the financial 
accounting of the company.23 By means of such auditor report the supervisory board shall 
18 Peter Hommelhoff/Daniela Mattheus, Die Rolle des Abschlusspruefers bei der Corporate Governance, in 
Handbuch Corporate Governance, 2003: p. 639 (645/646).
19
 Cf. Rafael La Porta/Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes/Andrei Shleifer, Corporate ownership around the world, 
October 1998, Table II and III; Henry Hansmann/Reinier Kraakmann, The End of History for Corporate 
Law, Harvard Law School, John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business, Discussion Paper No. 
280, January 2000, at III.D.
20
 Cf. William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules versus Principles versus Rents, 
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 48: p. 1023 (1054).
21
 Cf. William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules versus Principles versus Rents, 
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 48: p. 1023 (1054).
22 Peter Hommelhoff/Daniela Mattheus, Die Rolle des Abschlusspruefers bei der Corporate Governance, in 
Handbuch Corporate Governance, 2003: p. 639 (645).
23
 See § 171 (1) Stock Corporation Act (“Aktiengesetz” – AktG), § 321 German Commercial Code 
(“Handelsgesetzbuch” – HGB).
7be entitled to decide if management board decision are (1) within German GAAP and (2) 
appropriate regarding the election of accounting methods (if not obligatory).24 Conse-
quently, the supervisory board acts on behalf of the company to agree with the auditor on 
his engagement.25
2. Management compensation
a. U.S. – Equity compensation “without limits”
The idea of compensating management and employees with equity instruments 
and especially stock options dates back to the 1950’s. The manager is granted by the 
corporation a right to purchase a corporation’s share within a designated time period at a 
set price (“strike price”). The option holder benefits if the market value of the underlying 
share is at or increases above the strike price.26 The reasons for the rise of this type of 
compensation instruments were three-fold. First, tax law provided a favorable tax 
treatment for certain types of “incentive stock options”.27 Second, the development of the 
capital markets in the 1980’s, especially the takeover and Leveraged Buyouts (LBOs), 
brought a new focus on aligning management with shareholder interest.28 In addition, 
24 Peter Hommelhoff/Daniela Mattheus, Die Rolle des Abschlusspruefers bei der Corporate Governance, in 
Handbuch Corporate Governance, 2003: p. 639 (646).
25
 Cf. § 111 (2), sentence 3 AktG.
26
 See Jesse H. Choper/John C. Coffee/Ronald J. Gilson, Cases and Materials on Corporations, 5.E., p. 
149/150.
27
 Cf. §§ 421, 422 IRC. These types of plans due to their requirements focus on employee compensation, 
not management compensation; cf. Matthew A. Melone, Art Compensatory Stock Options worth 
reforming?, Gonzaga Law Review, Volume 38: p. 535 (546/547).
28
 See John C. Coffee, Jr., What caused Enron? A capsule social and economic history of the 1990s, 
Cornell Law Review, Vol. 89: p. 269 (273/274).
8accounting treatment for stock options was advantageous. Under APB No. 2529 the 
corporation issuing stock options was able to avoid expensing the fair market value of 
these options in its financial statements.30 Thereby the corporations were able to compen-
sate their executives without reducing earnings. As the method of choice equity instru-
ments, especially stock options, became common.31
Most States have statutory provisions specifically dealing with stock options.32
Typically, the issue of rights or options to directors, officers, or employees requires an 
authorization by at least the majority of the votes at the shareholder meeting.33 The 
adoption for such plan shall provide for the material terms and conditions upon which the 
options are to be issued. However, performance targets, holding requirements or similar 
limitations are not demanded by State corporate law.34 From an accounting perspective,
29 Accounting Principles Board, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants., Opinion No. 25, 
Accounting for Stock Issued to Employees (APB No. 25). Issuing corporations may continue to account 
stock options under APB No. 25 provided they disclose the effect of expensing the fair market value of 
these stock options in a footnote; cf. Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement No. 123, and 
Statement No. 148.
30
 So-called “fixed plans” under APB 25, which required a certain design of the stock option plan without 
any performance goals (other than the share price); see Matthew A. Melone, Art Compensatory Stock 
Options worth reforming?, Gonzaga Law Review, Volume 38: p. 535 (554/555). 
31
 Between 1981 and 1984, the percentage of companies with stock option plans increased from 68% to 
84% for manufacturing companies and from 43% to 77% for retail companies; cf. Jesse H. Choper/John C. 
Coffee/Ronald J. Gilson, Cases and Materials on Corporations, 5.E., p. 150, Fn. 96.
32
 For New York State cf. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law, § 505.
33
 See N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law, § 505 (2)(d).
34
 Cf. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law, § 505 (2)(e). The courts typically apply the business judgment rule with 
respect to the boards determination whether or not a corporation should compensate managers based on the 
market value of common stock; see Lieberman v. Becker, 38 Del. Ch. 540 (Supreme Court 1959). Only if 
the payments constitute “spoliation or waste”, the compensation might be excessive; cf. Rogers v. Hill, 289 
U.S. 582 (1933). After Enron a more restrictive approach might be possible, see In re Walt Disney, 825 
A.2d 275 (Court of Chancery 2003).
9performance targets might even be negative, they typically35 result in an obligation to 
expense in the financial statements the intrinsic value of the stock options at the date of 
exercise.36
b. Germany – Stock Options yes, but limited
In Germany, stock purchase plans for employees were popular starting in the 
1970’s. These plans allowed employees to purchase a very limited number of stock and 
provided for defined holding periods.37 Due to the limited benefits management typically 
did not participate in these plans.
Stock option plans as means of management compensation became common in 
Germany starting in the mid 1990’s. Equity compensation was understood as an impor-
tant part of the “shareholder value concept” the importance of which grew to be popular 
in German business at that time. The early stock option plans were based on convertible 
bonds due to restrictive rules concerning the issue of share capital by management. In 
1998, the German Stock Corporation Act (“Aktiengesetz” – AktG) was amended to 
enable all stock corporations to implement stock option plans. According to the new 
provisions in §§ 192 (2) No. 3, 193 (2) No. 4 AktG, a shareholder resolution can autho-
rize the management board (or the supervisory board in case of options for members of 
the management board) to issue stock options. The shareholder resolution has to deter-
35
 Otherwise in case of a so-called “premium priced” plan, providing for an strike price X % above the fair 
market value of the underlying stock at date of grant.
36
 So-called “variable plan”: at the date of grant no measurement date because not both the number of 
shares and the exercise price with respect to those shares are known with certainty; for the criteria see 
Matthew A. Melone, Art Compensatory Stock Options worth reforming?, Gonzaga Law Review, Volume 
38: p. 535 (554, 568).
37
 Cf. §§ 71 (1) No. 2, 203 (4) AktG, which resulted from legislation at this time. 
10
mine the number of options available to members of the management board as well as 
performance targets which have to be met to exercise the options.38 In addition, the Stock 
Corporation Act requires compensation of members of the management board to be 
appropriate.39 If the supervisory board which is responsible for the compensation of the 
members of the management board40 does not comply with these rules, the members are 
liable to the corporation.41
Notably, German GAAP – as U.S.-GAAP – does not require to expense stock 
options.42 However, the accounting treatment does not change if the stock option plan 
provides for performance targets and therefore at least does not discourage defining
performance goals.
III. REASONS FOR THE ENRON FAILURE
1. Failure of the gatekeepers, especially auditor
Arthur Andersen, Enron’s auditor, provided a broad range of consulting services 
for Enron. This multi- service involvement with the client might be the principal reason 
for Arthur Andersen’s failure in forcing Enron to comply with U.S. GAAP. But there are 
several other issues worth mentioning.
38
 § 193 (2) No. 4 AktG.
39
 See § 87 AktG.
40
 See § 84 AktG.
41
 Cf. §§ 93, 116 AktG.
42
 As of today there are no legal binding accounting rules with respect to the treatment of stock options in 
the P&L. According to the prevailing opinion no expenses are necessary.
11
a. Loss of auditor independence
In the 1990’s, the accounting profession became increasingly cartelized. This 
development was not initiated solely by business reasons, but by rather technical 
independence rules. An audit firm was treated as independent, if the revenue with a 
specific client did not exceed a certain percentage.43 But audit firms did not only grow in 
size. They developed into “multi-service” firms which offered management and tax 
consulting work as well as legal and financial services. The audit services were utilized 
as a “portal of entry” into lucrative clients.44 Low audit fees were agreed on (so-called 
“low balling”) which were cross financed by fees generated with consulting services.45
These consulting services created a new type of client-auditor relation for at least 
two reasons. First, it was no longer the auditor who could “fire” the client.46 On the 
contrary, the client was able to punish the auditor by terminating consulting contracts
without the public embarrassment associated with an auditor dismissal. “Cooperative”
auditors could be rewarded with new consulting business.47 The client was able to bribe 
43 Jonathan R. Macey/Hillary A. Sale, Observations on the role of commodification, independence, and 
governance in the accounting industry, Villanova Law Review, Vol. 48: p. 1167 (1176).
44 Theodore Eisenberg/Jonathan R. Macey, Was Arthur Andersen Different? An Empirical Examination of 
major Accounting Firms’ audits of large clients, Yale Law School, Center for Law, Economics and Public 
Policy Research Paper No. 287, p. 7; John C. Coffee, Jr., What caused Enron? A capsule social and 
economic history of the 1990s, Cornell Law Review, Vol. 89: p. 269 (291).
45 John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s about the Gatekeepers, stupid”, The Business Lawyer, 
Vol. 57: 1403, Fn. 38 and accompanying text; John C. Coffee, Jr., What caused Enron? A capsule social 
and economic history of the 1990s, Cornell Law Review, Vol. 89: p. 269 (291).
46
 See above, at II.1.a.
47 John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s about the Gatekeepers, stupid”, The Business Lawyer, 
Vol. 57: 1403, Fn. 40, 41 and accompanying text; Jonathan R. Macey/Hillary A. Sale, Observations on the 
role of commodification, independence, and governance in the accounting industry, Villanova Law 
Review, Vol. 48: p. 1167 (1178/1179); John C. Coffee, Jr., What caused Enron? A capsule social and 
economic history of the 1990s, Cornell Law Review, Vol. 89: p. 269 (292); Theodore Eisenberg/Jonathan 
R. Macey, Was Arthur Andersen Different? An Empirical Examination of major Accounting Firms’ audits 
12
or coerce the auditor in its core professional role using the disciplinary tool of consulting 
fees.48 Second, by providing consulting services on management, tax, IT, or accounting 
related issues, auditors lost their function as an independent control of the systems and 
results implemented. As William W. Bratton states: “an auditor is hardly likely to 
question the effectiveness of a compliance system sold by his or her own firm.”49
b. Reputation no longer key of business model
In the late 1990’s the capital markets grew to unknown heights. This changed the 
function of gatekeepers, especially the auditors. Their reputations was no longer required 
by the clients to achieve low costs of capital – the market “absorbed” new equity invest-
ment anyway. Consequently, management of the clients regarded the audit no longer as 
valuable or necessary, but rather as a formality.50
Realizing that reputation no longer was the key of doing business, audit firms 
focused on selling their services. The “certified audit” became a commodity understood 
as only one part of a variety of services offered to the client.51 All of the big accounting 
of large clients, Yale Law School, Center for Law, Economics and Public Policy Research Paper No. 287, 
p. 8.
48 John C. Coffee, Jr., What caused Enron? A capsule social and economic history of the 1990s, Cornell 
Law Review, Vol. 89: p. 269 (292).
49 William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules versus Principles versus Rents, 
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 48: p. 1023 (1030).
50 John C. Coffee, Jr., What caused Enron? A capsule social and economic history of the 1990s, Cornell 
Law Review, Vol. 89: p. 269 (293).
51 Jonathan R. Macey/Hillary A. Sale, Observations on the role of commodification, independence, and 
governance in the accounting industry, Villanova Law Review, Vol. 48: p. 1167 (1177).
13
firms followed this new approach.52 Due to a concentrated market they were able to risk 
even a loss in reputation as long as all of the few competitors left in the market behaved 
similarly.53 As a result, audit firms were increasingly willing to accept risky accounting 
policies in order to get lucrative consulting revenue.
c. liability of the audit firms limited
The legal environment for audit firms changed in the 1990’s. For several reasons 
the expected liability costs considered by auditors, deciding whether or not to accept 
aggressive accounting policies favored by the client, declined.54 The Supreme Court in 
1991 shortened the statute of limitations applicable to securities fraud to one year after 
discovery or three years after violation.55 Private “aiding and abetting” liability in 
securities fraud cases was eliminated by a Supreme Court decision in 1994.56 As a last 
step, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) established new 
52
 See Theodore Eisenberg/Jonathan R. Macey, Was Arthur Andersen Different? An Empirical 
Examination of major Accounting Firms’ audits of large clients, Yale Law School, Center for Law, 
Economics and Public Policy Research Paper No. 287, p. 2.
53 John C. Coffee, Jr., What caused Enron? A capsule social and economic history of the 1990s, Cornell 
Law Review, Vol. 89: p. 269 (300).
54
 See John C. Coffee, Jr., What caused Enron? A capsule social and economic history of the 1990s, 
Cornell Law Review, Vol. 89: p. 269 (288).
55 Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991); see John C. Coffee, 
Jr./Joel Seligman, Securities Regulation – Cases and Materials, 9.E., p. 1293; John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Understanding Enron: “It’s about the Gatekeepers, stupid”, The Business Lawyer, Vol. 57: 1403, Fn. 29 
and accompanying text; John C. Coffee, Jr., What caused Enron? A capsule social and economic history of 
the 1990s, Cornell Law Review, Vol. 89: p. 269 (288).
56
 See Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994); Theodore 
Eisenberg/Jonathan R. Macey, Was Arthur Andersen Different? An Empirical Examination of major 
Accounting Firms’ audits of large clients, Yale Law School, Center for Law, Economics and Public Policy 
Research Paper No. 287, p. 6; John C. Coffee, Jr., What caused Enron? A capsule social and economic 
history of the 1990s, Cornell Law Review, Vol. 89: p. 269 (288); cf. also John C. Coffee, Jr./Joel Seligman, 
Securities Regulation – Cases and Materials, 9.E., p. 1289, addressing the enactment of § 20 (e) of the 
Securities Act of 1934, as well as In re Enron Corp. Securities, Derivatives & ERISA Litigation, 235 
F.Supp 2d 549 (United States District Court, S.D. Texas), 2002, adopting the “maker” theory of primary 
liability.
14
pleading standards for securities fraud actions and limited the liability to the proportion 
of the victims’ losses corresponding to the auditor’s responsibility.57 These changes of 
the legal environment were accompanied by less strict enforcement by the SEC.58
As a result of these legal and enforcement changes, expected liability costs 
declined.59 Consequently, auditors more often chose to accept and certify the client’s 
accounting even if they recognized a risk that the accounting treatment might not be in 
accordance with U.S. GAAP.
d. Corporate Governance of Audit firms
The changing business and legal environment did not only alter the audit firm’s 
approach towards the client. The Corporate Governance of the audit firms themselves 
was also subject to change.
Due to the high-risk character of their business audit firms have elaborate internal 
control and monitoring systems.60 These monitoring systems rely on the influence of the 
57
 § 21D (b), and (f) of Securities Act of 1934; cf. Theodore Eisenberg/Jonathan R. Macey, Was Arthur 
Andersen Different? An Empirical Examination of major Accounting Firms’ audits of large clients, Yale 
Law School, Center for Law, Economics and Public Policy Research Paper No. 287, p. 6; John C. Coffee, 
Jr., What caused Enron? A capsule social and economic history of the 1990s, Cornell Law Review, Vol. 
89: p. 269 (288/289); William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules versus Principles 
versus Rents, Villanova Law Review, Vol. 48: p. 1023 (1029).
58 John C. Coffee, Jr., What caused Enron? A capsule social and economic history of the 1990s, Cornell 
Law Review, Vol. 89: p. 269 (290).
59 Cf. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the General Counsel, April 1997: Report to the 
President and the Congress on the first year of practice under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
of 1995 (available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies.shtml), under II.A., stating the decline of class 
actions against “secondary” defendants (i.e. auditors).
60 William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules versus Principles versus Rents, 
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 48: p. 1023 (1030).
15
internal monitoring staff. In the late 1990’s those internal monitoring functions were no 
longer understood as an essential part of doing business by all members of the audit 
firms.61 The focus of doing business had shifted from a reputation- to a sale-based 
approach.62 In addition, the risk of liability had declined. Not only the audit firms’ 
expected liability costs,63 but also – due to the emergence of the LLP – the individual 
partners’ liability for the wrongdoing of other firm members.64 Thus, the internal control 
system developed to assure compliance with auditing standards set by the firms no longer 
guaranteed best practice.
This problem was amplified by the engagement structure within the big 
accounting firms. In the case of important or multinational clients, generally, one partner
(so-called “lead partner”) is responsible for overlooking all transactions with the client. 
Typically, due to the client’s size, this creates a situation similar to a “one-client” 
practice,65 leading the individual partner to be more receptive to his audit client’s 
interest.66 The lead partner’s compensation and career within his firm depend on the 
61 John C. Coffee, Jr., What caused Enron? A capsule social and economic history of the 1990s, Cornell 
Law Review, Vol. 89: p. 269 (301).
62
 See above, under III.1.b.
63 See above, under III.1.c.
64 Jonathan R. Macey/Hillary A. Sale, Observations on the role of commodification, independence, and 
governance in the accounting industry, Villanova Law Review, Vol. 48: p. 1167 (1171/1172). – It should 
be mentioned that German audit firms typically are incorporated. Therefore personal liability of members 
of the firm is no issue at all.
65 John C. Coffee, Jr., What caused Enron? A capsule social and economic history of the 1990s, Cornell 
Law Review, Vol. 89: p. 269 (292); John F. Olson, Looking beyond the Efficient Markets Hypothesis: A 
comment on Professor Macey’s Post-Enron Analysis, Cornell Law Review, Vol. 89: 527 (528/529).
66 Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and Enron, Cornell Law Review, 
Vol. 89: p. 394 (409).
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revenue generated with this one client. As a result the lead partner might choose to risk 
the own firm’s reputation for the benefit of consulting and audit fees with the client.67
Since the internal monitoring systems of the big audit firms in the late 1990’s relied for 
the most part on the cooperation of the partners,68 the lead partner were able to pursue 
their own interest without being constrained by the firm.69
2. Management compensation
Equity-based compensation for members of the management is aimed to streng-
then the management’s focus on shareholder interests.70 Nevertheless, Enron exemplifies 
the weaknesses of compensating manager by means of stock options.
Management compensation by means of equity instruments is intended to make 
managers more sensitive to their firm’s market price.71 During the late 1990’s the strong 
growth of the Capital Markets and the accompanying media attention reinforced this 
impact of equity-based compensation. As a result, the management’s focus shifted from 
67 Jonathan R. Macey/Hillary A. Sale, Observations on the role of commodification, independence, and 
governance in the accounting industry, Villanova Law Review, Vol. 48: p. 1167 (1172); John C. Coffee, 
Jr., What caused Enron? A capsule social and economic history of the 1990s, Cornell Law Review, Vol. 
89: p. 269 (301).
68 Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and Enron, Cornell Law Review, 
Vol. 89: p. 394 (410).
69
 Cf. the colorful description of Enron auditor Arthur Andersen and its lead partner by Jonathan R. 
Macey/Hillary A. Sale, Observations on the role of commodification, independence, and governance in the 
accounting industry, Villanova Law Review, Vol. 48: p. 1167 (1179-1181), showing the weakness of 
Arthur Andersen’s control system. In the Enron case Arthur Andersen’s quality control officer was 
overruled and replaced after warning of Enron’s accounting practices; see John C. Coffee, Jr., What caused 
Enron? A capsule social and economic history of the 1990s, Cornell Law Review, Vol. 89: p. 269 (302).
70
 See above, under II.2.
71 John C. Coffee, Jr., What caused Enron? A capsule social and economic history of the 1990s, Cornell 
Law Review, Vol. 89: p. 269 (275); Matthew A. Melone, Art Compensatory Stock Options worth 
reforming?, Gonzaga Law Review, Volume 38: p. 535 (537/538).
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the relationship between the firm’s market price and break-up value as a measure of “fair 
value” to the likely future performance of their firm’s stock in the short run.72 This is
especially true with respect to stock options. These instruments allow taking advantage of 
a rising stock price without any financial risk even if the stock price should drop (again). 
The structure of stock options therefore encourages managers to take greater risk to 
inflate the company’s stock price.73 In addition, due to relaxed holding requirements for 
the stock received on exercise of the stock options,74 most executives were free to sell the 
underlying stock on the same day. Thus, they were able to exploit even daily gains in the 
firm’s share price.75
The accounting treatment of stock options amplified this development. Most 
companies, limited to pay a fixed salary of max. $ 1 million p.a. to the top executives by 
tax law,76 decided to compensate their executives by granting stock options.77 Since such 
72 John C. Coffee, Jr., What caused Enron? A capsule social and economic history of the 1990s, Cornell 
Law Review, Vol. 89: p. 269 (275/276).
73 John C. Coffee, Jr., What caused Enron? A capsule social and economic history of the 1990s, Cornell 
Law Review, Vol. 89: p. 269 (275).
74
 In 1991, the SEC relaxed the holding period requirement under § 16 (b) of Securities Act of 1934 -
executives could tack holding period of the stock option to holding period of the underlying shares; see 
SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-28869, Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and 
Principal Security Holders, 56 Fed. Reg. 7242, amending Rule 16b-3 (amendment explained under 
IV.B.2.); John C. Coffee, Jr., What caused Enron? A capsule social and economic history of the 1990s, 
Cornell Law Review, Vol. 89: p. 269 (276).
75
 Cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., What caused Enron? A capsule social and economic history of the 1990s, Cornell 
Law Review, Vol. 89: p. 269 (276).
76
 § 162 (m) IRC allows max. $ 1 million p.a. for CEO or one of the four highest paid executives as 
deductible expenses; see John C. Coffee, Jr., What caused Enron? A capsule social and economic history of 
the 1990s, Cornell Law Review, Vol. 89: p. 269 (274); for details Matthew A. Melone, Art Compensatory 
Stock Options worth reforming?, Gonzaga Law Review, Volume 38: p. 535 (543/544).
77
 See Matthew A. Melone, Art Compensatory Stock Options worth reforming?, Gonzaga Law Review, 
Volume 38: p. 535 (539).
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type of performance-based remuneration does not guarantee any benefits, typically, the 
number of stock options granted included additional options for the inherent risk in 
performance-based compensation not to get anything at all. There was no market force 
stopping the companies from doing so. The additional stock options did not show up in 
the financial statements,78 and therefore were a kind of remuneration without a payee.79
This might explain the excessive compensation some executives received during the late 
1990’s.80 Being paid in such amounts, executives were encouraged to inflate the stock 
price (e.g. by means of questionable accounting) and then leave.81 Two or three years 
worth of compensation enabled them to live “comfortable” for the rest of their life. 
78
 See above, under II.2.a. A change in the accounting treatment proposed by the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) in 1993 failed due to lobbying of the industry; cf. Matthew A. Melone, Art 
Compensatory Stock Options worth reforming?, Gonzaga Law Review, Volume 38: p. 535 (555/556).
79
 This for sure is not true. The current shareholders get diluted by distributing new or treasury shares 
below fair market value – they are paying the price for compensating with stock options.
80
 Top five for 1999: Robert Annunziata (Global Crossing Ltd.) $ 193,784,118; Joseph Nacchio (Qwest 
Communication Intl., Inc.) $ 172,205,151; Dennis Kozlowski (Tyco International) $ 138,331,617; Thomas 
Siebel (Siebel Systems) $ 134,437,170; and Michael Jeffries (Abercrombie & Fitch) $ 124,513,616. Top 
five for 2000: Steven Jobs (Apple Computer) $ 690,347,363; Thomas Siebel (Siebel Systems) 
$ 293,097,323; Rowland Landon (Kansas City Southern Inds.) $ 245,016,942; Sanford Weill (Citigroup 
Inc.) $ 230,033,668; and Dennis Kozlowski (Tyco International) $ 139,494,530. For more detailed numbers 
on total compensation received cf. Rajesh Aggarwal, Executive Compensation and Corporate Controversy, 
Vermont Law Review, Vol. 27: p. 849 (859, 866); Michael B. Dorff, Softening Pharaoh’s Heart: 
Harnessing Altruistic Theory and Behavioral Law and Economics to Rein in Executive Salaries, Buffalo 
Law Review, Vol. 51: 811 (821-826).
81 John C. Coffee, Jr., What caused Enron? A capsule social and economic history of the 1990s, Cornell 
Law Review, Vol. 89: p. 269 (276/277).
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IV. HOW DID LEGISLATION REACT?
1. U.S. legislation - Sarbanes-Oxley Act
The “Public Company Accounting Reform and Investors Protection Act of 2002” 
(“Sarbanes-Oxley Act”)82 passed Congress by nearly unanimous votes and was signed 
into law by the President on July 30, 2002. The Sarbanes- Oxley Act has to be understood 
as the immediate response to the corporate accounting scandals of Enron and WorldCom 
in 2001 and 2002. To address the problems legislation, besides addressing special issues 
which had become evident in these corporate failures, focused on regulating the 
accounting profession.83
a. Rules with respect to auditors
i. Creation of Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
In a decisive first step, the Sarbanes- Oxley Act created a self-regulatory body, the 
“Public Company Accounting Oversight Board” (PCAOB), to oversee the audit of public 
companies that are subject to the securities laws, and related matters, in order to protect 
the interests of investors and further the public interest in the preparation of informative, 
accurate, and independent audit reports for companies the securities of which are sold to, 
and held by and for, public investors.84 Although the PCAOB is a private body, 
established as a non-profit corporation, it is subject to SEC oversight.85 The five members 
82
 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
83
 See John C. Coffee, Jr., A brief tour of the major reforms in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, ALI – American 
Bar Association Continuing Legal Education, Dec. 5, 2002.; John C. Coffee, Jr., What caused Enron? A 
capsule social and economic history of the 1990s, Cornell Law Review, Vol. 89: p. 269 (303/304).
84
 Cf. § 101 (a) of Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
85
 § 107 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
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of the PCAOB are appointed by the SEC for five-year terms.86 Only two certified public 
accountants are allowed to serve as members of the board;87 this limitation shall prevent 
the “capture” of the PCAOB by the accounting profession.88 The PCAOB is funded by a 
so-called Annual Accounting Support Fee paid by the issuers as well as registration and 
annual fees charged to accounting firms.89
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act “transfers” the auditor profession into a new world of 
regulation and interference.90 All accounting firms that prepare audit reports for an issuer, 
the securities of which are registered under Securities Act of 1934 or which has filed a
Registration under Securities Act 1933,91 must register with the PCAOB,92 and are 
subject to inspections by the PCAOB.93 As a standard setter the PCAOP shall establish or 
adopt auditing, quality control, ethics, independence, and other standards relating to the 
preparation of audit reports.94
86
 See § 101 (e)(1), (e)(4)(A) and (e)(5) of Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
87
 § 101 (e)(2) of Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
88 John C. Coffee, Jr., A brief tour of the major reforms in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, ALI – American Bar 
Association Continuing Legal Education, Dec. 5, 2002, under II.A.
89
 Cf. §§ 102 (f), 109 (c)(1), (d) of Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
90 Jonathan R. Macey/Hillary A. Sale, Observations on the role of commodification, independence, and 
governance in the accounting industry, Villanova Law Review, Vol. 48: p. 1167 (1183).
91
 See definition of “issuer” for details, § 2 (a)(7) of Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
92
 §§ 101 (c)(1), 102 (a) of Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
93
 §§ 101 (c)(3), 104 (a) of Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
94
 §§ 101 (c)(2), 103 (a) of Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
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Under this power, delegated by the Congress to the PCAOB,95 the board shall set 
auditing standards providing for96 the preparation and maintenance of audit work papers,
second partner review and approval within the audit firms, as well as detailed description 
in the audit report of the auditor’s testing of the internal control structure of the issuer.97
Quality control standards with respect to registered public accounting firms shall for 
example, relate to the monitoring of professional ethics and independence from issuers.98
ii. Treatment of non-audit services
Enron demonstrated that consulting relationships can contribute to audit failures.99
Consequently, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act prohibits auditors from providing consulting 
services. Several types of non-audit services defined in a list in § 201 (a) of the Act (e.g. 
bookkeeping, financial information systems design and implementation, appraisal or 
valuation services, management functions, legal services and expert services unrelated to 
the audit) are impermissible.100
95
 Critical regarding this approach: William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules 
versus Principles versus Rents, Villanova Law Review, Vol. 48: p. 1023 (1026), “The Delegation Gamble”.
96
 For details see § 103 (a)(2)(A) of Sarbanes-Oxley Act; Jonathan R. Macey/Hillary A. Sale, Observations 
on the role of commodification, independence, and governance in the accounting industry, Villanova Law 
Review, Vol. 48: p. 1167 (1184).
97
 According to § 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act the issuers have to implement internal control structure 
and procedures for financial reporting. William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules 
versus Principles versus Rents, Villanova Law Review, Vol. 48: p. 1023 (1028), points out that Sarbanes-
Oxley Act does not provide for new rules with respect to the audit practice itself (i.e. what should be 
tolerated by audit partners and what are sanctions for departures from GAAP). This might be a next step for 
the PCAOB in exercising its power to establish or adopt other standards under § 103 (a)(2)(B)(vii), 
(3)(A)(i) of Sarbanex-Oxley Act.
98
 For details cf. § 103 (a)(2)(B) of Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
99
 See above, under III.1.a.
100
 The list basically carries over SEC regulations instead of barring all non-audit services; see William W. 
Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules versus Principles versus Rents, Villanova Law 
Review, Vol. 48: p. 1023 (1031).
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All other non-audit services require a “preapproval”.101 The activity must be 
approved in advance by the audit committee of the issuer,102 in accordance with the 
preapproval requirements defined in § 202 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. In effect, this 
might prevent audit clients to contract their auditor for non-audit services. The pre-
approval process is time consuming. Since the non-audit services provided by the 
remaining big accounting firms are substitutable, the management might choose to get 
the services from one of the competitors. In addition, new shareholder activism by 
institutional investors might pressure audit committees not to approve non-audit services 
by the auditor.103
Tax services are explicitly allowed as long as approved in advance.104 This 
provision might be a result of the lobbying power of the audit firms105 to secure an
important source of revenue,106 but still seems justified due to the close link of tax issues 
101
 Please note the “de minimus” exception in new § 10A (i) of Securities Act of 1934, as amended by 
§ 202 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
102
 The audit committee must be composed entirely of independent board members, cf. § 301 of Sarbanes-
Oxley Act. For more details  see John C. Coffee, Jr., A brief tour of the major reforms in the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, ALI – American Bar Association Continuing Legal Education, Dec. 5, 2002, under II.C.1.
103
 Cf. Deborah Brewster, Calpers to oppose Citigroup’s Prince, Financial Times, 04/12/2004: the U.S. 
pension fund Calpers will vote against Citigroup’s CEO Prince and Chairman Weill (as well as Coca-
Cola’s Warren Buffet), because of being members of the audit committee that had authorized the auditor to 
perform non-audit services.
104
 See new § 10A (h) of Securities Act of 1934 as amended by § 201 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
105
 See William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules versus Principles versus Rents, 
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 48: p. 1023 (1033/1034), describing the industry’s lobbying efforts and power 
with respect to the nomination of PCAOB chair.
106 John C. Coffee, Jr., A brief tour of the major reforms in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, ALI – American Bar 
Association Continuing Legal Education, Dec. 5, 2002, under II.B.2.
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and financial accounting. However, the fact that audit firms can continue to provide tax 
services to their audit clients might prove wrong in the future. With respect to tax 
structures provided by the auditor’s accounting firm, the auditor might face the same 
independence issues as with respect to IT-implementations or other services no longer 
allowed.107 Furthermore, it seems questionable whether the PCAOB has the power to 
include tax services in the list of prohibited services.108 The explicit referral to tax 
services in the new § 10A (h) of Securities Act of 1934109 can be understood as a con-
gressional override of the Board’s power. Even if the PCAOB still holds the power to 
prohibit tax services, an actual attempt might fail due to the audit firms’ lobbying 
power.110
iii. Audit partner rotation
Enron’s failure demonstrated that the client-auditor relationship in case of big 
national or multinational clients is similar to a “one-client” practice. In response to this 
problem, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires auditors to rotate the lead audit partner at least 
every five years.111
107
 The SEC’s final rule 33-8183: Strengthening the Commission’s Requirements Regarding Auditor 
Independence, under II.B.11., tries to respond to this by banning tax services focused on tax avoidance.
108
 Cf. new § 10A (g)(9) of the Securities Act of 1934 (“any other service that the Board determines”).
109
 As amended by § 201 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
110
 See William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules versus Principles versus Rents, 
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 48: p. 1023 (1033/1034).
111
 § 203 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
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Congress stopped short of mandating audit firm rotation.112 Under this alternative 
approach a particular accounting firm may be auditor for a particular issuer only for a 
limited time period.113 Nevertheless, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act calls for a study and a 
report by the Comptroller General on the potential effects of requiring a mandatory 
rotation of public accounting firms.114 This might lead to new legislation in the future. It 
should be noted, however, that in 2002 the time for implementation of these rules might 
have been better. Today, the accounting industry is gaining influence in Washington 
again.115
iv. No “revolving door” between audit firms and their clients
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act seeks to close the “revolving door”116 between audit 
firms and their clients. Many of the employees of Enron had been employees of Arthur 
Andersen before. This personal connection which might jeopardize the independence of 
the audit firm shall no longer be allowed at least on top executive level. Accordingly, 
audit firms are banned from auditing if the CEO, CFO, Chief accounting officer or an 
equivalent person was in the past year employee of the accounting firm.117
112 John C. Coffee, Jr., A brief tour of the major reforms in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, ALI – American Bar 
Association Continuing Legal Education, Dec. 5, 2002, under II.B.3.
113
 See definition in § 207 (c) of Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
114
 § 207 (a), (b) of Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
115
 Cf. William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules versus Principles versus Rents, 
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 48: p. 1023 (1033/1034).
116 John C. Coffee, Jr., A brief tour of the major reforms in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, ALI – American Bar 
Association Continuing Legal Education, Dec. 5, 2002, under II.B.3.
117
 § 206 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
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b. Management compensation
Despite the fact that management compensation can be understood as one of the 
reasons for the corporate failures in 2001/2002,118 the Sarbanes-Oxley Act does not 
address the issue of equity or other types of management compensation directly. Only in 
the context of financial accounting and disclosure rules management compensation is 
targeted: if a company is required to prepare an accounting restatement due to the 
material noncompliance with any financial reporting requirement under the securities 
laws the CEO and CFO of the issuer shall reimburse the company for any incentive- or 
equity based compensation received during the 12 months following the filing.119
Changes of stock ownership of officers and directors (e.g. sales of stock received after 
exercise of stock options) have to be reported within two business days.120 Furthermore, 
§ 402 (a) of Sarbanes-Oxley Act bars companies from directly or indirectly taking out 
loans to executives. As a consequence, companies are no longer able to lend executives 
funds needed to tender the exercise price of stock options to the issuing corporation.121
c. Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act development
On March 31, 2004 the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) published 
a Proposal on Equity-Based Compensation (Exposure Draft) as an amendment of FASB 
Statements No. 123 and 95.122 Under the proposal all forms of share-based payments to 
118
 See above, under III.2.
119
 § 304 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act. For further information see John C. Coffee, Jr., A brief tour of the major 
reforms in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, ALI – American Bar Association Continuing Legal Education, Dec. 5, 
2002, under II.C.3.
120
 § 403 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
121
 See Matthew A. Melone, Art Compensatory Stock Options worth reforming?, Gonzaga Law Review, 
Volume 38: p. 535 (540).
122
 Download available at http://www.fasb.org.
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employees (including stock options) would be treated the same, triggering compensation 
expenses in the income statement over vesting period measured at fair value123 at grant 
date.124 The proposal resulted from the FASB’s approach to achieve substantial 
convergence in this area between the U.S. GAAP and International Accounting Standards 
(IAS).125
2. German and European legislation
a. Rules with respect to auditors
The auditor under German law is understood as gatekeeper assuring the interest of 
the investing public as well as assistant for the supervisory board in its internal control of 
the management.126 These two functions require the same independence of the auditor 
crucial under the U.S. approach.127 Under German corporate law it is the supervisory 
board which acts on behalf of the corporation with respect to the auditor. This relation-
ship could be undermined by the management board employing the audit firm to provide 
consulting services.128 Accordingly, German legislation after Enron focused on this issue.
123
 Exposure Draft, paragraph 6 and Appendix B, favor a mathematical model (Binomial Lattice) over the 
alternative Black-Scholes-Merton formula. This immediately drew criticism for two reasons: first, the 
binominal approach would be unworkable because to complex, and second, the all companies which 
already expense options apply the Black-Scholes-Merton formula; see Dan Roberts/Joshua Chaffin, FASB 
unveils options proposal, Financial Times, 03/31/2004; more detailed with respect to valuation: Roberto 
Medoza/Robert Merton/Peter Hancock, A simple way to value stock options, Financial Times, 04/01/2004.
124
 Exposure Draft, paragraph 1, 5. The proposed statement eliminates the alternative of continuing to 
account for share-based payment arrangements with employees under APB No. 25. 
125
 Exposure Draft, paragraph 2. See also Adrian Michaels/Andrew Parker, Lobbyist stick to their guns 
over options plan, Financial Times, 03/31/2004.
126
 See above, under II.1.b.
127 Peter Hommelhoff/Daniela Mattheus, Die Rolle des Abschlusspruefers bei der Corporate Governance, 
in Handbuch Corporate Governance, 2003: p. 639 (652/553).
128
 See above, under III.1.a.
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i. German legislation
(1) Treatment of non-audit services
German rules of auditor independence are based on the understanding that no 
auditor shall be allowed to audit its own services provided to the issuer (so-called 
“Selbstpruefungsverbot”).129 However, consulting services at present are permissible as 
long as the final decision over several alternatives presented to the client by the audit firm 
is up to the client.130 Of decisive influence is if there are reasons for the concern that the 
auditor is biased.131
Looking back at Enron, WorldCom and similar failures in Germany (e.g. 
Flowtex), this general approach no longer seems appropriate. Thus, new legislation has 
been proposed incorporating a list of prohibited services into the German Commercial 
Code (“Handelsgesetzbuch” – HGB).132 The services disqualified recall § 201 of 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Internal audit outsourcing services, management or financial 
services, actuarial and valuation services133 as well as financial information system 
129
 Besides this persons having a financial interest in the issuer or a personal relationship (e.g. board 
member or employee of the issuer or an affiliate) are banned from providing audit services, cf. § 319 (2) 
No. 1-4 HGB.
130
 Cf. § 319 (2) No. 5 HGB; Federal High Court (“Bundesgerichtshof” – BGH), 04/21/1997, BGHZ 135, 
260; BGH 11/25/2002, DB 2003, 383. See also Karl Ernst Knorr/Christoph Huelsmann, Zur Staerkung der 
Rolle des Abschlusspruefers, NZG 2003, 567 (569); Kurt Kiethe, Der Befangene Abschlusspruefer –
Schadenersatz bei Interessenkollision?, NZG 2003, 937.
131
 See § 318 (3) HGB.
132
 Proposed Accounting Law Reform Act (“Bilanzrechtsreformgesetz” – BilRegG), 12/15/2003, with 
reasons for Government proposal, available at http://www.bmj.bund.de. The proposed BilRegG has been 
amended by German Cabinet decision, dated 04/21/2004 – the new version is available at 
http://www.bmj.bund.de.
133
 See new § 319 (3) No. 3 b)-d) HGB, as amended by proposed BilReG, 12/15/2003.
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design and implementation 134 are no longer allowed. Furthermore, the proposed law 
prohibits legal and tax services if these services go further than merely present alterna-
tives, and inevitably135 generate a different presentation of the financial statement in 
question which is not insignificant.136 In addition, § 319 (2) HGB provides for the general 
rule that an auditor is prohibited from providing audit services if concerns exists that the 
auditor due to her business, financial or personal relationship might be biased. This might 
be the case if the fees of consulting services exceed the audit fees or executives of the 
issuer are former employees of the audit firm.137
These changes resemble the rules implemented by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The 
German government proposed these changes and determined the prohibited services with
the U.S. rules in mind.138 Nevertheless, there are some differences. Legal services are 
only prohibited if the services provided result in a different presentation of the financial 
statement. This leaves room for legal services which German accounting firms are 
134
 § 319a (1) No. 3 HGB, as amended by proposed BilReG, 12/15/2003, and German Cabinet decision, 
date 04/21/2004.
135
 New § 319a (1) No. 2 HGB as amended by proposed BilReG, 12/15/2003, and German Cabinet 
decision, date 04/21/2004, uses the word “unmittelbar” (directly). However, Reasons of German Cabinet 
decision, 04/21/2004, p. 89, state that the effect of the proposed tax structure on the financial statements has 
to be inevitable.
136
 § 319a (1) No. 2 HGB, as amended by proposed BilReG, 12/15/2003, and German Cabinet decision, 
date 04/21/2004, reads as follows: “Ein Wirtschaftspruefer ist … von der Abschlusspruefung eines 
Unternehmens … ausgeschlossen, wenn er ... 2. in dem zu pruefenden Geschaeftsjahr ueber die 
Pruefungstaetigket hinaus Rechts- oder Steuerberatungs-leistungen erbracht hat, die ueber das Aufzeigen 
von Gestaltungsalternativen hinausgehen und die sich auf die Darstellung der Vermoegens-, Finanz- und
Ertragslage in dem zu pruefenden Jahresabschluss unmittelbar und nicht nur unwesentlich auswirken.”
137
 Cf. Reasons, Government proposal of BilReG, 12/15/2003, p. 44. See also proposed § 285 No. 17 HGB 
requiring disclosure of the ratio of consulting fees to audit fees. The proposed BilReG does not provide for 
a “revolving door” rule (see above, under IV.1.a.iv.); according to Reasons, Government proposal of 
BilReG, 12/15/2003, p. 48, this issue might be addressed in the German Corporate Governance Codex.
138
 See Reasons, Government proposal of BilReG, 12/15/2003, p. 16/17.
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generally allowed to provide if in connection with tax or similar services. On the other 
hand, the same restrictions apply to tax services. The more restrictive approach with 
respect to tax services139 seems reasonable given the fact that tax services are strongly 
related to accounting issues and therefore tax structures might determine the accounting 
treatment by the client.140
The proposed legislation does not require a preapproval of an audit committee or 
the supervisory board for non-audit services provided by the auditor. It is the Govern-
ment’s understanding that German corporate law provides for sufficient instruments to 
deal with this issue.141 The supervisory board itself under § 111 (4) AktG can define 
certain transactions to require the approval of the supervisory board. Since the super-
visory board relies on the auditors support in its control of the management board, it 
might be in the supervisory board’s best interest to establish this approval requirement for 
non-audit services.142
(2) Audit partner rotation
Already part of German law is § 319 (3) No. 6 HGB which disqualifies an auditor 
who certified the financial statement of the issuer more than six times in the last ten 
139
 This approach seems in line with the SEC’s final rule 33-8183: Strengthening the Commission’s 
Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence, under II.B.11.; cf. Reasons, Government proposal of 
BilReG, 12/15/2003, p. 51.
140
 This is especially true under German tax law. Under so-called “Massgeblichkeitsprinzip” tax accounting 
generally follows financial accounting (cf. § 5 (1) German Income Tax Act). To receive certain benefits 
under tax law the taxpayer has to account for the transactions in the financial statement correspondingly.
141
 Reasons, Government proposal of BilReG, 12/15/2003, p. 17, mentioning 7.2.1 of the German 
Corporate Governance Codex as well as § 111 (4) AktG.
142
 Reasons, Government proposal of BilReG, 12/15/2003, p. 17.
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years. The proposed § 319a (1) No. 5 HGB clarifies this provision by banning lead 
partners (and not audit firms) who have taken part in the audit in the last five years.143
(3) Implementation of new supervision body for financial disclosure
According to a bill proposed by the German government, a two- step supervision 
of the financial disclosure of listed companies shall be implemented.144 First, a private 
body, the so-called German Audit-organization for Accounting (“Deutsche Pruefstelle 
fuer Rechungslegung”) established in accordance with proposed § 342b HGB, will inde-
pendently audit financial statements of publicly listed companies. In a second step, the
Federal Institute of Control of Financial Services (“Bundesanstalt fuer Finanzdienst-
leistungsaufsicht”) might enforce the applicable accounting standards if the issuer does 
not comply. By means of this two-step approach, an enforcement body similar to the SEC 
shall be implemented.145
ii. German Corporate Governance Code
The German Corporate Governance Code (Code) presents essential statutory 
regulations for the management and supervision of German listed companies.146 First 
issued in 2002147, it is reviewed annually; the current version dates 05/21/2003. It 
143
 The Government proposal of BilReG, 12/15/2003, provided for a seven year period, cf. Reasons, 
Government proposal of BilReG, 12/15/2003, p. 53. The German Cabinet decision, 04/21/2004, amended 
this proposed § 319a (1) No. 5 HGB, requiring audit partner rotation after five years. This is in line with 
European legislation; cf. Reasons of German Cabinet decision, 04/21/2004, p. 91, and IV.2.a.iii.
144
 Proposed Financial Statement Control Act (“Bilanzkontrollgesetz” – BilKoG), 12/08/2003, with reasons 
for Government proposal, available at http://www.bmj.bund.de.
145
 Reasons, Government proposal of BilKoG, 12/08/2003, under A.I. (p. 18).
146
 See http://www.corporate-governance-code.de for English version of the Code.
147
 The Code was developed based on a decision of the German government, dated 09/06/2001, to meet 
international standards of Corporate Governance. The governmental decision resulted out of the findings of 
the Governmental Commission Corporate Governance, which in 2000/2001 recommended the development 
of a Corporate Governance Code. The Code has to be understood as an attempt to achieve international 
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contains recommendations marked in the text by use of the word “shall” and suggestions 
for which the Code uses terms such as “should” or “can”. According to § 161 AktG 
companies are obliged to disclose annually whether they comply with or deviate from the 
recommendations of the Code (“comply or explain”).148
According to 5.3.2 of the Code, the supervisory board shall set up an Audit 
Committee which handles issues of accounting and risk management, the necessary 
independence required of the auditor, the issuing of the audit mandate to the auditor, the 
determination of auditing focal points and the fee agreement.149 However, this Audit 
Committee differs from an Audit Committee under the Sarbanes- Oxley Act in one 
important matter: the members of the Audit Committee do not have to be independent 
board members. The Code only states, that the Chairman of the Audit Committee 
“should” not be a former member of the Management Board of the Company.150 With 
respect to the Audit Committee’s control of the auditor’s independence, the Code 
requires the Committee to obtain a statement from the proposed auditor stating whether 
any professional, financial and other relationship (e.g. consulting services provided)
convergence to attract international investors. However, the failure of Enron has contributed to some of the 
provisions of the Code. See for more details of the Code’s history Axel von Werder/Henrik-Michael 
Ringleb, in Ringleb/Kremer/Lutter/von Werder, Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex, Foreword, 
para. 1-33.
148
 German Corporate Governance Code, Foreword; see also Henrik-Michael Ringleb, in 
Ringleb/Kremer/Lutter/von Werder, Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex, Foreword, para. 39.
149
 If no Audit Committee is set up these obligations are within the power of the supervisory board, cf. 
§ 111 (2) AktG.
150
 Current members of the management board cannot be members of the supervisory board, cf. § 100 (2) 
AktG.
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exists between auditor and enterprise.151 This shall entitle the Audit Committee to make 
an informed decision whether or not to mandate the auditor.
iii. European legislation
A new Directive on statutory audit in the EU has been proposed by the European 
Commission.152 The statutory auditors are understood as the major defense against fraud. 
Accordingly, the proposed Directive is intended to clarify the duties of the auditors and to 
set out certain ethical principles to ensure the auditors’ objectivity and independence.153
The proposed Directive deals with a broad variety of measures. It requires an
Audit Committee154, the disclosure of fees paid to the statutory auditor or audit firm for 
the statutory audit and the fees for other assurance services, tax advisory services and 
other non-audit services,155 and to implement a “revolving door” rule.156 Besides this, the 
proposed Directive focuses on audit rotation and Corporate Governance of the audit 
firms. Art. 40 (c) of the proposed Directive obliges the Member States to ensure that the 
statutory auditor/key audit partner shall rotate within max. five years, or alternatively, the 
audit firm shall rotate within a maximum period of seven years. The Directive stops short 
151
 See 7.2.1 of the Code. Cf. Thomas Kremer, in Ringleb/Kremer/Lutter/von Werder, Deutscher Corporate 
Governance Kodex, 7.2.1 of the Code, para. 942-944.
152
 Proposed “Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on statutory audit of annual 
accounts and consolidated accounts” (proposed Directive), dated 03/16/04., text under 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/auditing/officialdocs_en.htm.
153
 European Commission, Press Release IP/04/340, 04/16/2004.
154
 See Art. 39 of proposed Directive, requiring at least one independent member with competence in 
accounting and/or auditing.
155
 Cf. Art. 50 of proposed Directive.
156
 See Art. 40 (d) of proposed Directive, disallowing the key audit partner to take up a key management 
position with the audit client within two years of resigning from the audit engagement.
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of requiring mandatory audit firm rotation. According to Art. 38 (1) of the proposed 
Directive, the Member States shall ensure that auditors of “public interest entities” (e.g. 
listed companies)157 publish on their website an annual transparency report including (1) 
the legal structure and ownership, description of network, (2) the governance structure of 
the audit firm, (3) the internal quality control system, (4) a statement about the audit 
firm’s independence practices, and (5) information on the basis of the partner 
remuneration. This focus on transparency of the audit firms appears to be the right 
approach to establish independent auditors. The disclosure requirements allow the 
investing public to assess the business model of the audit firm. This might lead to 
competition between the audit firms based on “good” Corporate Governance justifying 
higher audit fees.
b. Management compensation
Equity-based management compensation in Germany is subject to restrictions.158
The Stock Corporation Act requires performance criteria for stock options as well as an 
“appropriate” overall compensation of the members of the management board. However, 
new limitations have been implemented.
i. German Corporate Governance Code
According to 4.2.3 of the German Corporate Governance Code,159 as amended by 
the revision of May 21, 2003, the overall compensation of members of the management 
board shall comprise fixed and variable components. The new wording of the provision 
157
 See Art. 2 (11) of the proposed Directive.
158
 See above, under II.2.b.
159
 The Code’s approach is a “comply or explain” one, see under IV.2.a.ii.
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explicitly states that the compensation components must be appropriate, both individually 
and in total. A new focus is noticeable by identifying company stock with multi-year 
block period as the first of several examples for variable compensation components with 
long-term incentive effect and risk elements.160 This new recommendation is in line with 
the observations of the past corporate failures. Compensating with stock will not create 
the same problem as stock options which allow taking advantage of a rising stock price 
without any financial risk if the stock price should drop, thereby encouraging risky 
behavior.161 Furthermore, stock options and comparable instruments shall be related to 
“demanding, relevant comparison parameters”. For extraordinary, unforeseen develop-
ments a cap (limitation of the max. benefit) shall be agreed for by the supervisory 
board.162 These new recommendations are not mandatory. Nevertheless, companies 
which do not comply with these rules have to disclose the non-compliance to the market. 
ii. IAS-accounting rules
The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) on February 19, 2004 
issued International Financial Reporting Standard 2 “Share-based Payment” (IFRS 2) on 
accounting for share-based payment transactions, including the grant of stock options to 
employees.163 The IASB, explicitly mentioning the past major corporate failures, with 
this new standard wants to address the fact that investors might be misled by the 
160
 The first version of the Code named stock options first and did not mention stock with block periods at 
all.
161
 See above, under III.2.
162
 Para. 4.2.3 of the Code.
163
 See IASB Press Release, 02/19/2004, available at http://www.iasb.org.
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understatement of expenses in case of equity remuneration.164 No matter what form of 
compensation is paid, companies’ financial statements shall reflect the same effects on 
profit or loss. Accordingly, IFRS 2 requires the company to expense for stock option 
transactions in its financial statements based on the fair value of the stock options 
measured at grant date. These rules are applicable for consolidated financial statements of 
German companies starting in 2005.165
V. WHAT COULD BE DONE?
After Enron, U.S. and German legislation reacted similarly, focusing on auditors’ 
independence by enacti ng new rules such as rotation of partners within the audit firm and 
limitation of non-audit services. With respect to management compensation there was 
less activity. From a German perspective that might be understandable since limitations
were already in place. However, regarding the accounting treatment an initiative by the 
international standard setters (IASB and FASB) was necessary to solve the problem of 
inadequate recognition in the financial statements.
Considering the reasons of Enron’s failure the results already achieved might not 
be sufficient. A first step towards auditor independence could be stricter enforcement of 
the existing rules by the regulators.166 Since the Enron-debacle there is evidence of 
164
 Cf. IASB Press Release, 02/19/2004, citing IASB Chairman Sir David Tweedie.
165
 See new § 315a HGB, as proposed by BilReG, requiring listed companies to prepare their consolidated 
financial statements in accordance with international accounting standards; cf. also Reasons, Government 
proposal of BilReG, 12/15/2003, p. 3.
166
 The implementation of a new two-step supervision by German legislation (Bilanzkontrollgesetz” –
BilKoG), 12/08/2003, is based on this approach; see above, under IV.2.a.i.(3).
36
tougher action by the SEC.167 The following part will consider other possible
improvements. 
1. Auditor independence
a. Audit firm rotation
Both U.S. and German law provide for a mandatory rotation of the audit partner 
responsible for the client within the audit firm.168 However, neither the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act nor the current German legislation take the next step to require mandatory audit firm 
rotation. The U.S. legislator mandated the PCAOB present a report on this issue,169
thereby enabling the accounting firms and their lobby to block such future develop-
ment.170 The same can be stated with respect to the proposed EU-Directive. Audit firm 
rotation is offered as an alternative to audit partner rotation, not as a mandatory rule.171
The decision by the U.S. legislation to defer audit firm rotation need not neces-
sarily be wrong. Even if at first glance securing auditor independence by mandatory audit 
firm rotation seems convincing, the real goal of improving audit quality should be kept in 
167
 See for example In the Matter of ERNST & YOUNG LLP, 04/16/2004, download of the full text of the 
decision available at www.ft.com. The involvement of Ernst & Young with Peoplesoft, being the auditor of 
Peoplesoft and at the same time having a business agreement over software and consultancy, violated SEC 
independence rules for auditors. According to the decision Ernst & Young is banned from taking on new 
public audit clients in the U.S. for six months; Ernst & Young is not going to appeal the decision. For 
further information cf. Adrian Michaels, E&Y banned from taking new clients, Financial Times, 
04/16/2004; Adrian Michaels, E&Y pays for past indiscretions, Financial Times, 04/17/2004.
168
 See above, under IV.1.a.iii. and IV.2.a.i.(2).
169
 Cf. § 207 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
170 As noted above, the time for implementation of such rules has never been better than in 2002 – the 
accounting industry is gaining influence in Washington again; cf. William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-
Oxley and Accounting: Rules versus Principles versus Rents, Villanova Law Review, Vol. 48: p. 1023 
(1033/1034).
171
 See Art. 40 (c) of proposed Directive.
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mind. With respect to audit quality audit firm rotation is not automatically  the best 
solution. Certainly, there are valuable arguments for audit firm rotation: an effective peer 
review by the incoming audit firm might discourage aggressive accounting practices; the 
limited audit period could prevent conflicts of interest arising from long-standing rela-
tionship; and the ongoing change might promote a more competitive market for audit 
firms.172 Yet, the downsides have to be taken into account. There are significant start-up 
costs for both the auditor as well as the client (estimated at circa 20% by the accounting 
industry).173 More important, the impact on audit quality might be negative. As indicated 
by recent research, mandatory audit firm rotation may lead to lower audit quality.174
According to these research results the advantages of audit firm rotation are outweighed 
by the downsides of auditor change.175 Changing audit firms increases the risk of an audit 
failure in the early years – the cumulative knowledge of the existing audit team is lost and 
the new auditors need to go up the learning curve.176 Furthermore, the new auditor might 
172
 See Thomas Healey, The best safeguard against financial scandal, Financial Times, 03/12/2004.
173
 See United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, 
and Urban Affairs and the House Committee on Financial Services: Public Accounting Firms – Required 
Study on the Potential Effects of Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation (GAO-report), November 2003, p. 6. 
However, it should be noted that the average audit fees represent approximately 0.04% of company 
operating expenses; cf. GAO-report, p. 7. A significant gain in reputation, lowering the costs of capital, 
therefore might more than outweigh the additional auditing costs.
174 James Myers/Linda A. Meyers/Thomas C. Omer, Exploring the Term of Auditor-Client Relationship and 
the Quality of Earnings: A Case for Mandatory Auditor Rotation?, June 2002, download available at 
http://www.ssrn.com. James Myers/Linda A. Myers/Zoe-Vonna Palmrose/Susan Scholz, Mandatory Auditor 
Rotation: Evidence from Restatements, July 8, 2003, download available at http://www.ssrn.com.
175 James Myers/Linda A. Meyers/Thomas C. Omer, Exploring the Term of Auditor-Client Relationship and 
the Quality of Earnings: A Case for Mandatory Auditor Rotation?, June 2002, p. 21/22. According to 
James Myers/Linda A. Myers/Zoe-Vonna Palmrose/Susan Scholz, Mandatory Auditor Rotation: Evidence 
from Restatements, July 8, 2003, p. 22, a greater percentage of companies misstate during the first five 
years of an auditor-client relationship than over longer auditor tenure (leaving open whether this result is 
triggered by the fact that young companies typically show a higher percentage of misstatements).
176
 GAO-report, p. 6; Co-ordinating Group on Audit and Accounting Issues (CGAA), Final Report to the 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, January 29, 2003, p. 26.
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be less aggressive in the oversight of management early in an auditor-client relationship 
and might invest less time in the audit to recoup losses from the competitive practice of 
low-balling.177 This is especially true, if the audit firms can no longer cross-finance the 
audit division with consulting fees generated with the new client.
The failure of Parmalat might add some new information to the discussion. Italy is 
the only country having long time experience with mandatory audit firm rotation.178
Despite this fact, Parmalat’s auditor Deloitte & Touche failed to assure proper accounting 
by the company. As has been pointed out before, Parmalat’s Cayman Islands-based 
division, Bonlat Financing continued to be audited by Grant Thornton (the former auditor 
of the Parmalat group). Therefore, the new auditor is not to blame with the failure to 
detect the false documentation regarding the Bonlat accounts, which actually triggered 
the collapse of Parmalat.179 However, according to a report prepared for Italian prose-
cutors, Deloitte’s Italian office failed to apply basic accounting principles and verify 
“irregular” and “suspect” accounting entries.180 In the case of arising problems, Deloitte 
Italy lobbied within the audit firm to assure certification by the non-Italian units of 
177
 See James Myers/Linda A. Meyers/Thomas C. Omer, Exploring the Term of Auditor-Client Relationship 
and the Quality of Earnings: A Case for Mandatory Auditor Rotation?, June 2002, p. 5/6. 
178
 Italy has required mandatory audit firm rotation of listed companies since 1975. Brazil enacted similar 
law in 1999, Austria in 2004; Spain has abandoned such rules for listed companies in 1995; cf. GAO-
report, Appendix V. 
179 Thomas Healey, The best safeguard against financial scandal, Financial Times, 03/12/2004.
180
 Cf. Fred Kapner, Eight billion reasons to destroy Parmalat ‘Account 999’, Financial Times (print 
version ), 04/12/04, p. 17.
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Deloitte.181 Audit firm rotation therefore might not necessarily secure an independent 
high quality audit. These observations are in line with Italian research on the impact of 
mandatory audit firm rotation.182 This states that mandatory firm rotation shall have a 
negative effect on the quality of audit work during the first year of engagement as well as 
during the last three years of audit tenure.183
Another problem is worth mentioning. Any audit firm rotation rule might be in 
conflict with other independent requirements. Multinational clients in fact have only the 
choice between the four global accounting firms.184 In case of a mandatory rotation they 
would be required to choose one of the other three firms remaining. If non-audit services 
are provided to the client by these audit firms, the audit firms might have to decide 
whether to take up the position as an auditor or to stick to their position as a provider of 
more lucrative consulting services. The obvious solution to this problem would be to 
181 Fred Kapner, Parmalat investigators believe Italian branch of Deloitte ignored evidence, Financial 
Times (print version), 04/10/2004, p. 1; Fred Kapner, Eight billion reasons to destroy Parmalat ‘Account 
999’, Financial Times (print version ), 04/12/2004, p. 17.
182 Dallocchio/Vigano, The Impact Of Mandatory Audit Rotation On Audit Quality And On Audit Pricing: 
The Case of Italy, SDA Universita Bocconi, 2003 (Bocconi-study), cited after SEC’s final rule 33-8183: 
Strengthening the Commission’s Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence, Fn. 121. The study is not 
publicly available on the internet. GAO experienced difficulties to receive information about this study, 
too; cf. GAO-report, Appendix V “Italy”.
183
 Cf. Chew Ng, Rotation of Auditors: History and Recent Developments, available at 
www.unisi.it/eventi/3AHIC/programme.htm. The GAO-report points out that concerns have been raised by 
the Commissione Nazionale per le Societa e la Borsa (CONSOB) about the study’s methodology, accuracy, 
data used, and appropriateness of the conclusions: the GAO-report shares at least part of these concerns; cf. 
GAO-report, Appendix V “Italy”.
184
 Cf. GAO-report, p. 7.
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disallow audit firms to provide any non-audit services.185 However, this would be a ban 
to do business, a measure questionable at least under German constitutional law. 
In conclusion, the decision by the U.S. and German legislation to focus on audit 
partner rotation seems correct. Audit partner rotation might provide the same advantages 
as audit firm rotation (a “fresh look”) without the significant downsides of losing all of 
the audit firm’s knowledge of the client.
b. Corporate Governance within the audit firms, especially compensation
In the U.S. and in Germany, audit firms are understood as gatekeeper for the 
investing public ensuring full disclosure by the issuers. However, the audit firms 
themselves typically186 are not required to fully disclose details of their financial results. 
The proposed EU-Directive might change this. The Member States shall ensure that 
auditors of “public interest entities” publish an annual transparency report including the 
legal structure and ownership, description of network, the governance structure of the 
audit firm, the internal quality control system, a statement about the audit firm’s 
independence practices, and information of the basis of the partner remuneration.187 This 
might allow the audit firms to compete based on “better internal control”, or “better 
governance structure”. Hopefully, this will lead to a “race to the top” – thereby justifying 
higher audit fees necessary to refinance this investments by the audit firms.
185
 Such a rule would be favorable for law firms and other consulting business. Lobbying therefore might 
be driven by economic interests on both sides of the discussion. 
186
 The German divisions of the final four audit firms are incorporated. Therefore the general disclosure 
rules for corporations (i.e. §§ 264-289 HGB) apply to these firms.
187
 See above, under IV.2.a.ii.
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The requirement to disclose the basis for partner remuneration within the audit 
firms seems of special importance.188 Remuneration is understood as a primary means of 
monitoring and directing behavior. This is common understanding with respect to exe-
cutive compensation189 and should be equally true regarding remuneration of partners 
within accounting firms. As far as variable compensation is concerned, a shift in 
determining of the amount as well as the form of compensation could help to re-focus on 
the reputation of the audit firms.190 Annual bonus payments, based on revenue with 
clients, permit partners to focus on their individual revenue and enable them to imme-
diately “bail-out”. This adds to the pressure to create revenue to ensure a continuing 
career with the audit firm. Long-term incentives, providing for holding periods or deferral 
of payout of the compensation earned, might – at least partly – shift the focus towards 
securing and strengthening the reputation of the audit firm. Typical instruments for such a 
shift could be cash-based compensation plans.191 Compensation is based on a combina-
tion of individual (e.g. revenue of the cost center) and collective goals (e.g. annual net 
profit of the firm) which is payable only after a defined period of participation in the plan 
(e.g. five years). An audit firm compensating its partners by means of such remuneration 
schemes might be able to compete with its peers based on better reputation. This is 
188
 Art. 38 (1)(j) of the proposed Directive. 
189
 See above, under II.2.
190
 Cf. above, under III.1.b. and d., for the lost focus on the firm’s reputation.
191
 Equity-based compensation does not seem as favorable for two reasons: (1) the partners typically own 
the audit firm anyway, even if the firm is incorporated, and (2) audit firms, at least today, are not publicly 
listed, therefore capital markets are no able to immediately punish or reward the firms’ performance – one 
of the key features of equity compensation.
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especially true if new disclosure requirements oblige the audit firms to disclose the basis
for partner remuneration. 
c. Other areas for improvement
The Parmalat failure, besides the effects of audit firm rotation, might teach 
another lesson. It is not sufficient to have strict rules in place for the audit of a group’s
parent company (i.e. Italy), but rather for all the companies, including the subsidiaries,
contributing to the financial statement (i.e. Cayman Islands). International auditing 
standards, applicable to all audit firms participating in a group audit are therefore 
necessary.192 Furthermore, the audit firm of the parent company must take full respon-
sibility for the consolidated financial statements without being able to rely on the work of 
the subsidiaries’ auditors.193 The proposed EU-Directive provides for such full response-
bility.194 It should be mentioned that such global auditing standards may be based on new 
legislation or on the big accounting firms applying internal auditing standards globally. 
The latter approach would allow competition between the audit firms on who provides 
the most valuable audit (i.e. competing with reputation). However, such competition is 
only possible if the markets are willing to pay the price of increased auditing fees.
Another approach is worth mentioning. In some countries (e.g. France) all 
companies with an obligation to publish consolidated financial statements must have at 
192 Andrew Parker, Big firms must obey global audit rules, Financial Times, 04/12/2004; Editorial 
comment: The lessons of a scandal, Financial Times, 04/12/2004.
193 John Plenders, Schooled by scandal: what auditors and investors still have to learn from Europe’s 
accounting debacles, Financial Times (print version), 01/22/2004, p. 11; Andrew Parker, Big firms must 
obey global audit rules, Financial Times, 04/12/2004.
194
 Cf. Art. 27 (a) of proposed Directive.
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least two auditors who jointly sign the audit opinion on financial statements (so-called 
“joint audit”).195 Even one step further, two auditors could audit the financial statements 
issuing separate opinions (“combined audit”).196 Such a “double-check” might increase 
the creditability of the financial statements, resulting in lower costs of capital for the 
issuer. However, there are some down-sides. First, two audits trigger additional costs.197
Second, the audit is much more time consuming for the client and its audit committee 
having to deal with two audit teams.198 At this stage, it seems too early to require 
mandatory joint or combined audit. Nevertheless, for some issuers it might be worth 
opting for a joint audit on a voluntary basis – possibly lower costs of capital might justify
the additional fees and management input.
2. Management compensation
The change of the accounting treatment of equity-based compensation under IAS 
and the (proposed) change under U.S. GAAP are important steps towards a more 
controlled use of equity compensation.199
195 John Mellows, The Debate: Joint audits…, AccountancyAge.com, 08/29/2002; Andre O. Westhoff, 
Glaubwuerdigkeit des Jahresabschlusses: Brauchen wir eine Kontrolle der Kontrolleure bezogen auf die 
Abschlusspruefer und wenn ja, welche? (part II), DStR 2003: 2132 (2135).
196 Andre O. Westhoff, Glaubwuerdigkeit des Jahresabschlusses: Brauchen wir eine Kontrolle der 
Kontrolleure bezogen auf die Abschlusspruefer und wenn ja, welche? (part II), DStR 2003: 2132 (2135).
197
 According to Andre O. Westhoff, Glaubwuerdigkeit des Jahresabschlusses: Brauchen wir eine Kontrolle 
der Kontrolleure bezogen auf die Abschlusspruefer und wenn ja, welche? (part II), DStR 2003: 2132 
(2135), this did not happen in France due to fierce competition. However, assuming that the margins in 
audit business are not high (which is the case), a lower price means less scrutiny of the audit team in the 
audit means lower audit quality.
198 Ted Awty, The Debate: Joint audits…, AccountancyAge.com, 08/29/2002.
199
 See above, under IV.1.c. and IV.2.b.ii. 
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However, this does not necessarily mean that there is a substantial cut back on 
executive compensation.200 There is still plenty of opportunity for improvement which 
holds especially true to the U.S. The State corporate law does not provide for 
performance goals which have to be met or limitations on the maximum amount of total 
compensation. In Germany, these restrictions are part of the legal requirements to issue 
stock options (in the case of performance targets) or – at least – best practice under § 87 
AktG and the German Corporate Governance Code (in the case of a cap on the total 
benefit allowed).201 Furthermore, holding requirements for the stock received on the 
exercise of stock options are necessary to prevent immediate “bail-out” after exercising 
the options in the moment of a share-price peak. 
It seems problematic to implement these rules by means of the Model Business 
Corporation Act or Federal Securities law (as in the case of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). An 
amendment of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) might be more promising. This approach 
works with respect to employee stock options (§§ 421, 422 IRC) as well as fixed 
executive compensation (§ 162 (m) IRC). Besides action by the legislator, it is up to the 
shareholders to implement rules improving executive compensation. Amendments of the 
200
 According to recent surveys nearly 50% of the companies will cut back the eligibility and/or size of 
grants for employees below management levels. Even so, very few companies have any intention of 
reducing eligibility or the size of awards at the senior executive level; cf. Corey Rosen, Will Broad-Based 
Equity Survive Expensing?, 11/11/2003, text available at http://www.nceo.org. See also Dan Roberts, 
Executive bonuses set to match boom levels, Financial Times (print version), 03/22/2004, p. 1, showing top 
U.S. executive pay packages of up to $ 45.5 million.
201
 Para. 4.2.3 of the Code; cf. II.2.b. and IV.2.b.i.
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bylaws or at least non-binding recommendations by shareholder vote might increase the 
pressure on the board.202
VI. CONCLUSION
The U.S. and the German Corporate Governance regime share the understanding 
that independence of auditors is vital for the auditor’s function within the system. 
Accordingly, auditors are banned from certain non-audit services. The supervisory bo ard 
or an Audit Committee without members of the management is dealing with the auditors. 
Further, partners within the audit firms have to rotate to allow a “fresh-look”. An 
independent control institution regarding financial disclosure has been proposed in 
Germany as a counterpart to the SEC. A development towards convergence can be 
observed, even though both countries have a slightly different understanding of the 
function of auditors. Independence of auditors is the key in both systems, regardless of 
their function as a gatekeeper or an assistant to internal management control.
Regarding management compensation, both systems have a different approach. 
U.S. corporate law does not provide for mandatory limitations, i.e. performance targets. It 
is up to the shareholder to demand these changes.203 The proposed mandatory expense 
treatment of stock options might accelerate this development. However, convergence 
202
 Cf. the majority vote on PeopleSoft’s annual meeting in favor of expensing stock options, see Adrian 
Michaels, EDS switches camps over expensing options, Financial Times, 03/25/2004.
203
 Cf. new stock option program of IBM providing for “premium-priced” options with a 10% hurdle, see 
Elizabeth Wine/Stephen Schurr, Shift in option accounting rules could hit bottom line, Financial Times, 
03/02/2004.
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with respect to this issue requires more time. The German model seems more 
shareholder-value oriented.
What are the reasons for this different “speed” of convergence? The main reason 
might be more pressure for convergence towards U.S. ideas than implementing structures 
of any other country. Access to the U.S. capital market is the key for nearly all businesses 
worldwide. Accordingly, U.S. investors decide which rules should be implemented. 
These investors expect a Corporate Governance regime similar to the U.S. one. For
foreign countries to enable their companies to comply with these rules, they need to 
implement similar ones. Otherwise, the foreign companies would not be able to compete,
since they would have to obey both sets of rules. Simply said: if you want someone’s 
money you have to stick to their rules – right now the rules are set by the U.S. investors.
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